I know it; I teach it; but it’s still always so awesome to see the power of simply telling the truth. Sometimes when I speak or think a profoundly true thought, I get a shiver up my spine. Recently, I had this experience in a trial.
There were a few legal issues on which we won this recent trial but the main ones were pertaining to an Elston/Leetsdale, LLC v. CWCapital Asset Management, LLC. 87 So.3d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) issue and paragraph 22 of the mortgage. In Elston, the plaintiff alleged to only be the servicer, foreclosing on behalf of another entity, a trust. Id. The plaintiff was neither the holder nor the owner of the note or mortgage. Id. The sole witness was an employee of the servicer. Id. Without the trust joining or formally ratifying the actions of the servicer, the servicer plaintiff could not prevail. Id. This is an extremely rare fact pattern. Usually, when servicers are plaintiffs in foreclosure cases they allege to also be the holder. In the case on which this blog post is based, the Plaintiff alleged their capacity to sue solely as servicing agent for a trust, just like the plaintiff in Elston. Also, just like in Elston, the Plaintiff in our case offered no evidence to show that the trust joined or ratified the servicer’s actions. This was still a winnable issue for the Plaintiff but, fortunately for our client, their evidence was lacking. In addition to this issue, we also won based on a paragraph 22 violation. Those are the skimming-the-surface legal reasons why we won at trial. However, it took hours and hours of preparation, keeping my cool, and making tons of legally valid objections combined with one opportune moment, in which I admitted a weakness in our case, to seal the deal.
As to the paragraph 22 issue, there was a business record admitted into evidence that showed the acceleration letter was mailed, by regular mail, the day after the date on the actual letter itself. Among other things, paragraph 22 in the mortgage specifies that the default letter must provide “…a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured….” Paragraph 15 defines given as “…when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower’s notice address if sent by other means.” The letter in this case only stated that the borrower had to cure within “30 days of the date of this letter.” Yet, through the plaintiff’s own evidence, the letter was mailed 29 days earlier, not 30, and by regular mail, not first class. As a result, the letter was not “given” as required by the plain terms of paragraph 22 of the mortgage. Since compliance with paragraph 22 is a “condition precedent” to acceleration of the mortgage and to foreclosure, and since we properly raised this issue in our pleadings, the Plaintiff could not prevail. This is a highly technical argument, which needs ample citing to Florida Supreme court caselaw regarding contract interpretation. Without a deluge of strong case law, mixed with just the right amount of persuasion, this argument will go nowhere. There were a few other things wrong with the letter as well, which helped.